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AN ANALYSIS OF THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES 
ASSOCIATED WITH TIF USAGE IN WISCONSIN 
Dennis C. Jantzen 
 
The problems associated with “urban blight” can be connected with a variety of problems 
associated with the ongoing decay of American inner cities. These problems include white flight, 
crime, obsolete (and in many cases unsafe) infrastructure, drug and alcohol problems, adverse 
effects on community and neighborhood aesthetics, declining property values, negative impact 
on public health and safety, the diminution of economic development and investment, unsafe 
public spaces, and so forth.  These have been some of the difficult challenges that municipal 
leaders have faced.  One of the possible solutions to rectify the deterioration of United States 
inner cities includes the creation of Tax Incremental Districts (TIDs).  The purpose of this 
research paper is to provide an objective analysis of the usage of TIDs in the State of Wisconsin 
since 1975.  This literature review will provide a brief history of urban development and provide 
analysis of the positive and negative view points associated with the incorporation of TID as an 
economic revitalization tool.  This paper will specifically address the effects of TID usage in 
relation to property tax values, employment statistics, and TID usage trends. It will provide 
examples of TID abuses, a summary of the pros and cons associated with TIDs, and 
recommendations to improve TIDs.  The conclusion of this literature review will encapsulate and 
provide recommendations for where additional research and analysis is needed to provide a 
firm determination of the positive and negative attributes associated TIDs.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
This paper addresses several subtopics associated with Tax Incremental Financing 
(TIF) such as employment trends, types of TIF development projects, TIF abuses, the 
popularity of TIF, an objective analysis of TIF and property taxes in Wisconsin, the 
positive and negative effects of TIF, and the type of municipalities that are utilizing TIF 
in Wisconsin. At the conclusion of this literature review, this paper will provide 
recommendations for TIF policy changes that will assist TIF to operate in an efficient, 
non-ambiguous manner that is fair, and will help TIF fulfill the original intent of the TIF 
development program, which was to minimize urban blight.  TIF, if used properly as it 
was originally intended, is a valuable economic tool that can turn blighted properties into 
redeveloped properties that have increased property values which will pay increased 
property taxes.    
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History of Urban Renewal and the Birth of Tax Incremental Financing  
 
Urban renewal in the United States can be traced back to the Housing Act of 
1949.  This law was in response to a profound transformation that American cities were 
undergoing after World War Two. The history of  tax incremental financing (TIF) dates 
back to the 1950s as a means of financing improvements in blighted urban 
neighborhoods, and was invented by the California legislature (O'Toole, 2011).  
California legislation initiated TIF as a means of raising the matching funds required by 
the aforementioned federal urban renewal program which required municipalities with 
populations over 50,000 to finance one-third of the cost of redevelopment activities to 
match the two-thirds federal share (Briffault, 2010). However, actual TIF usage was 
sparse until the mid-1980s, when TIF popularity in many states experienced rapid growth 
(Byrne, 2009).  Only twenty-seven projects utilized TIF in its first fifteen years, and as 
late as 1970, there were only seventy-six TIF areas in California, and just six other states 
authorized TIF (Briffault, 2010).  The double whammy of the withdrawal of federal 
urban development aid funds beginning in the Nixon administration combined with the 
adoption of Proposition 13 in California in 1978, and comparable tax and expenditure 
limitations in other states soon after, led to a rapid and dramatic increase in the use of TIF 
(Briffault, 2010). Currently, 49 of the 50 states allow local governments to use TIF as an 
economic development tool.  Arizona is the only state that does not allow TIF.  
Established in 1975, the Wisconsin TIF law is one that allows municipalities to fund 
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development without utilizing current taxes.  Anticipated future revenue streams are 
earmarked to pay back the debt’s principal and interest (Skidmore, 2011).  Before TIF, 
when a community installed public improvements to promote private development, its 
property owners bore these costs, but all taxing entities that shared the tax base 
benefitted.  Law makers recognized this as an inequitable situation that sometimes 
discouraged development costs (Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2008).  Therefore, 
the TIF for economic development established its roots and has grown in popularity. 
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How Does the TIF Process Work? 
  
The first step is the creation of a Tax Increment District (TID).  A TID is an 
agreement between tax entities.  These bodies typically include any different 
municipalities involved, and other taxing organizations such as a school district, technical 
college, county, and in some cases, a special representative such as a water department or 
a sewage district.  After the formation and representative agreement by all of the tax 
district representatives, an application to the state department of revenue is submitted for 
determination of the property values within the district.  This is known as the district’s 
base value.  The department of revenue annually determines its equalized value. This is 
known as the current value.  The difference between the base value and the current value 
is the value increment.  The value increment is used to determine the amount of tax 
increment revenue that can be collected for that particular year (Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 2008).  Although state laws differ, TIF-generated funds generally can be used 
for a host of purposes, including the installation, repair, or upgrade of physical 
infrastructure, such as street lighting, curbs and sidewalk improvements, bridges and 
roads, water mains and lateral supply lines, sewage removal, wastewater treatment, storm 
drainage, parks, parking, environmental remediation of polluted sites, land acquisition 
and clearance, planning and feasibility studies, and the transaction costs of bond 
financing (Briffault, 2010).   
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Popularity of TIF 
  
Since TIF was invented in California, it is appropriate to begin analyzing the 
history, TIF usage, and its popularity in that state.  More than three out of four California 
counties use TIF. Moreover, TIF is rapidly growing outside of California.  From 1990 
through 1995, American cities sold $10.2 billion worth of bonds backed by TIF, more 
than 80 percent of which was for California (Man, 2001).  In the late 2000’s, 
municipalities sold nearly $20 billion worth of TIF bonds, and California’s share had 
declined to less than 64 percent. While California’s TIF bonds grew by 55 percent, TIF 
bonds in other states grew by 260 percent (O'Toole, 2011).  In Wisconsin, TIF utilization 
in municipalities has grown considerably; there has been a 400% increase since 1990 
especially in the southern and central areas of the state. TIF use in Wisconsin is one of 
the highest in the nation.  By 2008, there were approximately 1,000 active tax 
incremental districts (TIDs) worth $15 billion in assessed value throughout Wisconsin 
(Public Policy Forum, 2009).  In 2011, a total of 41 new TIDs were created in Wisconsin. 
The following shows how the 41 TIDs were certified: 
 4 Blight Elimination    
 8 Rehabilitation/Conservation 
 8 Industrial 
 21 Mixed Use 
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Figure 1. Breakdown of Type of Active TIDs in Wisconsin 
Effective January 1, 2011, there were 1,115     
active TIDs. The chart shows a breakdown  
of the types of active TIDs. (State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2012) 
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TIF and Property Taxes in Wisconsin 
  
The number of TIDs being created and amended has been on the rise in 
Wisconsin since the TIF program was first adopted in 1975.  At the same time, the 
amount of tax base and tax revenue devoted to TIDs has been growing.  The value 
increment is the amount of growth in a TID since creation. Between 2000 and 2009, the 
increment grew in Wisconsin by an average of 11.1% per year over the previous year, 
while the gross property value of cities and villages has grown at an annual rate of about 
6.9%.  With the economic turnaround of the last two years, those rates have averaged 
8.5% and 5.1%, respectively.  The percent of city/village that is value increment has 
grown from 3.5% in 2000 to 4.8% in 2011, where it has held steadily.  In 2011, value 
increment totaled $14.6 billion.  
As property value generated by TIF has increased, so have the taxes generated on 
that value.  Taxes that TIF value increments generate can only be used to pay for TIF 
eligible project costs until the TID is retired.  After the TID closes, the value is returned 
to the tax entities and the revenues generated by those properties can go to the general 
fund (State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2012).    
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Not all TIDs are Created Equally 
 TIF law in Wisconsin provides different rules for different types of TIDs. The 
reasoning is simple and makes sense.  An urban blight elimination project will almost 
certainly have higher costs than a “greenfield” industrial development because costs for 
demolition, environmental remediation, and site assembly are not associated with 
greenfield development, but are required in urban blight elimination projects.  Blight 
TIDs have longer lives than industrial TIDs because the scope of work is much larger.  
For this same reason, blight TIDs can receive longer extensions to their lives than 
industrial or mixed-use TIDs. The following TIF matrix (table 1) summarizes the 
different rules that govern the various types of TIDs in Wisconsin: 
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Tax Incremental District (TID) Criteria Matrix 
  Changes to Wisconsin's Tax Incremental Financing (TIF) Law were approved by 
Governor Doyle in early 2004, and again in 2005.  This matrix was developed as a guide 
to help identify TID criteria based on type and creation date of Tax Incremental 
Financing Districts.   
 To read the matrix, first look across the row at the top for the type of TID.  There are 
seven different types identified as follows:   
1. Existing TIDs created before 10/1/95  
2. Blighted TIDs  
3. TIDs created in need of Rehabilitation or Conservation work  
4. Industrial TIDs  
5. Mixed-Use TIDs created after 10/1/04  
6. Town Tourism, Agriculture, & Forestry TID's  
7. Environmental Remediation TIDs   
The first column lists the requirement questions.  By looking across the question row, you 
can find the criteria for a specific type of TID in the corresponding column.  
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Table 1- Tax Incremental District (TID) Criteria Matrix 
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What Type of TIF Projects are Permitted in Wisconsin? 
 
Each of the 49 states that allow TIF has similar rules regarding the type of TIF 
projects that are permitted for economic development.  In Wisconsin, TIF projects can be 
legally used to encourage development in blighted areas-those that are otherwise unlikely 
to develop or redevelop. This is known as the “but for” rule.  Basically the “but for” test 
is when the joint review board does not believe that the development will happen without 
some assistance. The Wisconsin Tax Incremental Law, 66.1105 describes “blighted area” 
as the following: 
1. An area, including a slum area, in which the structures, buildings or 
infrastructure, which by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or 
obsolescence, have inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, or 
sanitation. An area which lacks open spaces, contains a high density of 
population and overcrowding, or demonstrates the existence of conditions 
which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any 
combination of these factors which are conducive to ill health, 
transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, or crime, 
and are detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 
2. An area which is predominantly open which consists primarily of an 
abandoned highway corridor (blight elimination and slum clearance), or 
that consists of land upon which buildings or deterioration of structures or 
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of site improvements, or otherwise, substantially impairs or detracts the 
sound growth of the community.  
A blighted area does not include predominantly open land area that has 
been developed only for agricultural purposes, commonly called 
“greenfield” development (Moskal, 2005).  
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Benefits of TIF 
  
TIF proponents claim the potential benefits of TIF utilization include a broader 
tax base for the municipality, school district, technical college and county to share, 
increased employment, an improved business environment, elimination of blighted areas, 
increased property values, stimulated private investment and development, and the 
formation of a partnership for economic development between the municipality, school 
district, technical college and the county (Moskal, 2005). The economic advantage of TIF 
is that payment is closely tied to benefits.  One of the best ways to measure the value that 
infrastructure or service improvements add to a property is by observing the change in the 
property’s actual market value. Since property tax assessments should, in principle, 
reflect such changes, a property-designed tax increment policy should collect additional 
revenue roughly in proportion to the increased value generated by the improvement 
(International City County Management Association, 2004 page 337). 
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Example of a TIF if the Property Value Increases 
As an example (very simplified), we start with an empty lot in a new TIF area that 
has a value of $3000. Its current EAV (Equalized Assessed Value) is one-third of that 
amount, or $1000. (Taxes are calculated on the EAV number.) There is a commercial 
building being built on the property (for $150,000) that will come on the tax rolls in 
2010. Typically, the property values seem to increase about 4% per year. In this example 
(for simplicity), the typical 4% increase is not taken into account. In 2009, the assessed 
value of the property goes up by 10% due to general improvements in the TIF area. Let’s 
assume that the total tax rate on the property is 1% so the taxing bodies currently get $10 
($1000 EAV x 0.01) in real estate taxes.  
Table 3 – (TIF) Property Value Increase Table  
Year 
Property 
Value 
EAV 
Value 
(1/3 of 
Property) 
Tax 
Rate 
Tax 
Bill 
Amount 
To 
Taxing 
Body 
Estimated 
amount 
to TIF 
Fund 
2007 $3,000 $1,000 0.0100 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 
TIF District Enacted 
2008 $3,000 $1,000 0.0100 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 
Property Value Goes Up 10% 
2009 $3,300 $1,100 0.0100 $11.00 $10.00 $1.00 
Building Built On Lot (Value $150,000)  
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2010 $153,300 $51,100 0.0100 $511.00 $10.00 $501.00 
Tax Rate Increases from 1% to 1.1% 
2011 $153,300 $51,100 0.0110 $562.10 $10.00 $552.10 
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Example of a TIF if the Property Value Decreases 
Contrary to the previous example is an example of a TIF property struggling to 
meet its planned goal.  We assume the same variables as in the former example. We start 
with an empty lot in the new TIF area that has a value of $3000. Its current EAV 
(Equalized Assessed Value) is one-third of that amount, or $1000. (Taxes are calculated 
on the EAV number.) There is a business building being built on the property (for 
$150,000) that will come on the tax rolls in 2010. In 2009, the assessed value of the 
property goes down by 10% due to poor economic conditions in the TIF area. Let’s also 
assume that the total tax rate on the property is 1%, so the taxing bodies currently get $10 
($1000 EAV x 0.01) in real estate taxes. (Village News, TIF Distict 101).  Now let’s also 
assume that the soft economy continues over the next two years with a 5% reduction in 
property value for the year 2010, and a 10% reduction in property value for the year 
2011.  
 Table 4 – (TIF) Property Value Increase Table 
Year 
Property 
Value 
EAV 
Value 
(1/3 of 
Property) 
Tax 
Rate 
Tax 
Bill 
Amount 
To 
Taxing 
Body 
Estimated 
amount 
to TIF 
Fund 
2007 $3,000 $1,000 0.0100 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 
TIF District Enacted 
2008 $3,000 $1,000 0.0100 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 
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Property Value Goes Down 10% 
2009 $2,700 $900 0.0100 $9.00 $9.00 $0.90 
Building Built On Lot (Value $150,000) property unexpectedly decreased 5% 
2010 $142,365 $47,455 0.0100 $474.55 $9.00 $465.55 
Tax Rate Increases from 1% to 1.1%, property decreased 10% 
2011 $128129 $42,710 0.0110 $469.81 $9.00 $460.81 
 
 Using the aforementioned two examples, the difference between the projected 
dollar amount of $552.10 became $460.81. This represented a 16.5% percentage decrease 
between the amount the TIF was expecting and what it may have received in a weak 
economy. This simplified example has become a common reality during the tough 
economic times that the United States has weathered in the last 15 years.  As illustrated in 
the above table, TID introduced during an economic cycle downturn could underperform 
the pro-forma.  In some cases, a TID might not generate an increment sufficient to cover 
the investment, thus risking failure (Skidmore, 2011).   
The TID has two options if a deficit occurs.  The municipality can continue with 
the TID, in hopes that some potential development will change the projected deficit into a 
positive cash flow, or it can dissolve the district, at which time the municipality shall 
become liable for all unpaid costs.  A recent article from the Kenosha News, a daily 
newspaper circulated in Southeastern, Wisconsin, highlighted the concern that a Paddock 
Lake village trustee had regarding the Paddock Lake Village Board issuing $3.6 million 
in bonds, the money used both to refinance existing debt, and to pay for engineering for a 
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new tax increment financing district. Although he ultimately voted to approve it, Trustee 
Terry Burns said he was reluctant to include the $350,000 in the bond issue.  He said he 
was worried about the possibility that TIF would not generate enough money to make 
payments on the bonds within two years, and that the repayment would fall on village 
taxpayers. “I made a promise that they (village taxpayers) would never have to pay for 
the west-side water system,” Burns said. “We’re sticking our necks out that this TIF 
district is going to be solvent. ... Essentially you’re putting the taxpayers at risk of footing 
that bill” (Smith, 2012).  Financial adviser James Mann said development already under 
way in the TIF district should be enough to pay for the portion of the payments on the 
bonds associated with the $350,000. Paddock Lake began building a water system in 
2005, putting in water lines and wells. The project was designed to serve five 
developments that had been approved at that time, which all eventually failed as the 
economy soured. However, all five developments failed when the economy went into 
recession, and none of the homes were built, leaving no users for the partially completed 
system. The new TIF is designed to fund completion of the project. If it remains 
incomplete, the loans taken out to pay for the project would ultimately need to be paid by 
village taxpayers (Smith, 2012). This is a real case scenario that has played out all too 
often during the difficult economic times the United States has waded through the past 
decade.  See table which shows the percentage of TIDs underwater after four years in 
Wisconsin from 1990 through 2009.  Underwater refers to the property value being below 
the initial base value four years after TID creation. In 2008, 60% of manufacturing TIDs 
were underwater and risked default, and may have needed to be bailed out by taxpayers.  
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The opportunity cost needs to be weighed for each purposed developmental project, 
especially when the majority of the project financing is being guaranteed by tax payers.  
Table 2 - Percentage of TIDs Underwater After Four Years  
  
Year  Total   Residential   Commercial  Manufacturing  
1990   28.57%   21.43% 30.00%  16.67% 
1991   15.00%  14.29%  7.14%  14.29% 
1992   10.53%  33.33%  14.29%  13.33% 
1993  8.11%  36.36%  12.50%  8.33% 
1994   16.22%  16.00%  11.54%  18.75% 
1995   12.12%  20.00%  31.58%  16.67% 
1996  7.69%  15.38%  15.63%  21.43% 
1997   13.16%  9.09%  28.00%  23.53% 
1998   19.72%  27.91%  27.08%  27.27% 
1999   10.53%  16.33%  15.38%  13.04% 
2000  8.00%   30.56%  9.52%   6.67% 
2001   11.43%  20.41%  17.78%  18.18% 
2002   13.16%  28.57%  15.15%  12.50% 
2003   16.67%  16.13%  20.59%  5.88% 
2004   11.86%  8.82%  18.37%  26.09% 
2005   19.57%  29.41%  12.12%  33.33% 
2006  7.69%  35.14%  7.14%  0.00% 
2007  7.81%  5.56%  1.92%  25.00% 
2008   11.36%  11.11%  14.81%  60.00% 
2009  9.28%  18.18%  7.35%  35.29% 
Source: Wisconsin Department of Revenue  
 
   Any municipality creating a TID must be willing to accept the possibility that it 
may not produce the desired results.  When this happens, the taxpayers in that 
municipality will be responsible for assuming any unpaid project costs (Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue, 2008).  There are political risks associated with TIF as well.  
Keep in mind that a partnership between the municipality, school district, technical 
college, and county is required to use TIF.  The partners need to know enough about the 
law, the proposed project, their responsibilities, and each other’s expectations if they 
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hope to function effectively.  Council must be dedicated to carrying out the original 
project plan for close to 20 years.  There are many stakeholders who are likely to be 
positively or adversely affected by the project, or who can alter the results of the project 
(Moskal, 2005).  If one or more of these stakeholders is adversely affected by the project, 
the project could run into real trouble, impacting its feasibility.  
Perhaps the biggest urban renewal disaster in United States happened in 
Englewood, Colorado.  In 1985, the city sold $27 million in bonds to subsidize a retail 
development known as Trolley Square.  After the development was completed, few shops 
leased space in the development, and by 1991, the TIF revenues were inadequate to cover 
bond repayments, so the Englewood Urban Renewal Authority defaulted. The 
development was bulldozed a few years later because it was considered an eyesore.  
Given the huge subsidy, the developer may not have analyzed the market as carefully as 
someone risking his or her own money. It is possible that, if no subsidy were available, a 
development would have taken place on the site that would still be productive today. 
Urban renewal TIF projects effectively transfer the risk from a few developers to the 
taxpayers in general.  If an urban-renewal district is a spectacular failure, the authority 
might default on its bonds. If it is only a partial failure, taxpayers end up receiving lower 
quality of services, or paying higher taxes while the urban renewal authority takes more 
time than expected to repay the bonds. Either way, the developers face a far lower risk, 
which explains why such developments are so popular among the development 
community (Lang, 2007). This particular TIF mess left the bond holders, rather than the 
taxpayers, on the hook for approximately $27 million worth of bonds, but this does not 
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mean that TIF is a good deal for taxpayers.  In fact, such defaults are rare, because cities 
have found many ways of capturing taxpayer funds to pay for TIF.   
First, in many states, TIF agencies get rewarded for inflation.  As property values 
increase due to inflation, TIF revenues rise even if the district does nothing to improve 
the area.  Normally, such increased revenues would be used by schools and other tax 
entities to offset increased costs, but since the TIF district starves tax entities while the 
TID is active, these organizations must either raise taxes, or cut back on services to deal 
with escalating expenditures.   
Second, in most states, TIF districts gain when other tax entities persuade voters 
to increase taxes.  For example, say a school district persuades voters to pass a bond levy 
that increases taxes by $1 for every $1,000 of property value. Taxes are increased both 
inside and outside of the TIF district, but the increased revenue inside the TIF districts, 
go to TIF, not to the school district.  
Third, TIF districts get credit for development that would have taken place in the 
district anyway.  If a city creates a TIF district out of a neighborhood that is already being 
gentrified by private developers, all the taxes on the new development in the 
neighborhood go to the TIF district, even though that development would have taken 
place without the TIF district.   
Fourth, TIF districts get accolades for development that takes place within their 
boundaries that would have occurred somewhere nearby anyway.  In a growing region, 
new homes, shopping centers, offices, and other developments will be built somewhere. 
TIF subsidies may attract such development to the district at the expense of development 
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somewhere else in the region. The result is no net increase to the region’s total tax base, 
but a net decrease to the tax revenues for schools and other entities that must compete 
with the TIF agencies for funds (O'Toole, 2011).   
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Abuse of TIF 
  
As TIF proliferated, it also evolved, shifting from what was initially an urban 
renewal program targeted at depressed central city areas, to a more general public 
investment and infrastructure financing scheme.  The redirection, or expansion, of TIF is 
best captured through the change in the language used to describe TIF activity from 
redevelopment – that is, the revitalization of a once vibrant, but now economically 
depressed or physically deteriorated area—to simply development, or increase in 
economic activity in an area that might have been vacant, farmland, undeveloped, or 
simply lightly developed (Briffault, 2010). 
While TIF has been used as a vital tool to create economic growth, it has also 
been abused by a broad range of players which includes politicians and developers.  For 
example, previous to becoming the current governor of California, Jerry Brown was the 
mayor of Oakland. Brown was intimately familiar with redevelopment agencies; as the 
mayor of Oakland, he had doubled the size of the city’s redevelopment districts.  
Although redevelopment funds are legally dedicated to fighting blight and promoting 
economic growth, the Los Angeles Times noted that cities often used them “as emergency 
ATMs to pay for core services, including police, fire and code enforcement, and 
sometimes the mayor’s salary.”  In fact, 15 percent of Mr. Brown’s salary when he was 
Oakland’s Mayor came from the city’s redevelopment agency (O'Toole, 2011).   
TIF has also been used to finance streetcar lines.   In 2010, both St. Louis and Fort 
Worth planned on using TIF money to build city-owned and operated streetcars (O'Toole, 
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2011).  Yet government-owned entities such as city operated streetcars do not pay 
property taxes. The tax increment would never happen since government owned property 
is not obligated to pay property taxes.  In Michigan, the Ann Arbor Downtown 
Development Authority gave a delicatessen $407,000, which was approximately the next 
15 years of the deli’s anticipated property taxes, to help it expand.  To acquire these 
funds, the deli owners had to ask the city to declare its property a “brownfield”, even 
though it was not actually polluted.  “Its economic development,” said an Ann Arbor 
planner. “It’s not about the environmental cleanup” (Morgan, 2010).  
Another questionable TIF tactic that municipalities use is that governmental 
entities often build infrastructure such as streets, sidewalks, parks, sewer systems, water 
plants, and parking garages.  In many cases, these infrastructure additions and or 
improvements would normally be paid for by developers.  The city then sells the land to 
developers for typically far less than what the city has invested (O'Toole, 2011).  This is 
unfair competition for a developer in the same area that did not receive TIF funding, or 
an infrastructure handout by the local government municipality. In addition, these abuses 
short change public schools and the tax payers.  This is the law of unintended 
consequences, and is a perfect example of why the government does not belong in the 
private sector, where it is able to pick the winners and the losers. Let the free market 
select the victors and the failures. 
Many states regulate the amount of land a municipality can put into a TIF district.  
For example, the state of Wisconsin limits creation of new districts or the addition of 
property to existing districts. The equalized value of property in the district, plus the 
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value increment of all existing districts cannot exceed 12% of the total equalized value of 
taxable property within the municipality (Wisconsin Department of Revenue).  However, 
this regulation has been abused by municipalities located in the state of Wisconsin.  For 
example, TIF has become such a popular method of economic development that many 
communities now exceed their state-imposed TIF limits.  Wisconsin cities and villages 
are not legally allowed to TIF more than 12% of their total equalized value.  The 
municipality’s utilization rate may grow above 12% as property values fluctuate, but it is 
restricted from further TIF use after hitting the 12% limit.  Of the 385 cities and villages 
using TIF in 2008, more than one in four (27%) now exceeds the state’s TIF limit (Public 
Policy Forum, 2009). In this case, the “rules are rules” mentality should be incited to 
minimize over-ledgering and to minimize tax payer risk. 
The assignment of future valuation increases to the TIF district can encourage 
municipalities to target undeveloped land or other property with low assessed values, 
particularly agricultural land eligible for preferential farmland programs. Those areas 
may not be blighted or underserved by private developers, but they may offer dramatic 
increases in assessed value simply by being reclassified as commercial or industrial.  A 
1999 study found that 45 percent of Wisconsin’s 661 TIFs have been used to develop 
open space, primarily farmland or green space including, most famously, a Wal-Mart 
Supercenter built on what had been an apple orchard in Baraboo (Youngman, 2011). The 
meaning of blighted has been transformed from decayed or deteriorated structures, unsafe 
and unsanitary conditions, and economic and social distress to something a lot more like 
“underdeveloped”, or lacking the physical or legal preconditions for further economic 
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development.  Indeed, TIFs are now so widely used for suburban and urban shopping 
malls that the coauthor of the Council of Development Finance Agencies of the 2008 Tax 
Increment Finance: Best Practices Reference Guide is the president of the International 
Council of Shopping Centers (Briffault, 2010). These types of TIF abuses destroy 
farmland, wild life habitats, hinder natural storm drainage, and may cause drainage that 
adversely affects environmental watersheds.  
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Six Major Criticisms of TIF 
There are six major criticisms often leveled against tax increment financing (TIF). 
First, TIF helps outer suburbs lure jobs from center cities and inner suburbs. State 
legislators may be well-advised to prioritize central city development when authorizing 
TIF.  Large cities may be negatively affected by excessive TIF use among their 
neighboring communities.  Blighted and vacant properties in central cities, which may 
remain undeveloped due to TIF projects in outlying areas, negatively impact central city 
economies (Public Policy Forum, 2009). 
Second, TIF should be confined to seriously blighted areas.  A sound 
recommendation would be to change TIF laws so that the TIF regulations are clear and 
not ambiguous.  Pennsylvania law describes blight as including “inadequate planning of 
the area,” “excessive land coverage by the buildings thereon,” “faulty street or lot 
layout,” and “the defective design and arrangement of the buildings.”  In Missouri, blight 
includes “defective or inadequate street layout”, and best of all, “lack of community 
planning” support a finding of blight.  Not all courts have overreached in determining 
that a property is blighted.   An example comes from the village of Orion, Illinois; that 
land was blighted because of “loose or missing roof shingles, gravel drives, grass 
growing through the cracks in a driveway and surface cracking in driveways and 
sidewalks”. This request was rejected by the court and explained as no more than 
“routine disrepair common to many communities.”  Furthermore, when the wealthy 
Chicago suburb Burr Ridge sought to create a TIF in order to attract a Radisson Hotel and 
Conference Center, it declared that part of the village was blighted because the parcels in 
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the proposed TIF site were “too large”, one of Illinois’s statutory blighting factors.  The 
court sternly responded that on that theory, “one would have to accept the conclusion that 
the entire country is blighted” (Briffault, 2010).  
The State of Minnesota defines blight more concretely than most states.  
Minnesota restricts TIF use to blighted areas in which: (1) over 70% of the district is 
occupied by buildings, streets, utilities, and similar structures, and (2) over 50% of the 
buildings within the district are structurally substandard (Minn. Stat. 469.174) (Public 
Policy Forum, 2009). Other states should copy the State of Minnesota’s definition of 
blight and eliminate the ambiguity of determining what a blighted property is. The broad 
definition of what a blighted property is has caused confusion and abuse. 
Third, TIF is often used to subsidize the increased supply of retail development in 
markets where demand is static, achieving little except the displacement of sales from 
other locations.  Researchers Dye and Merriman concluded that the use of TIF-backed 
commercial development did little more than substitute for, or displace commercial 
activity that would have occurred elsewhere within the city (Merriman, 2001).  
Fourth, cities sponsoring tax increment projects unfairly and inefficiently drain 
property tax revenues from other taxing entities including schools and counties.  A TIF 
program may commit to the incremental property tax revenues that would have gone to 
overlapping local governments, such as school districts.  These revenues are often 
substantial.  In Illinois, for example, only 15 percent of local property tax revenues, on 
average, go to a municipality.  The remaining 85 percent go to the county, school 
districts, and other special districts, with most of the money in the TIF going to the school 
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districts.  In many cases, this has led to mistrust between school districts and 
municipalities.  To help alleviate this animosity between municipalities, school districts, 
and other special districts, many states have curtailed municipal TIF authority.  These 
states now require notification to school districts and other overlapping governments 
about proposed TIF districts.  In addition, many of these states require that TIF advisory 
boards seat overlapping representatives, and require consent from the these 
representatives before their revenues may be redirected to the TIF project (Public Policy 
Forum, 2009).  
Fifth, there are few serious obstacles preventing local governments from 
sponsoring TIF projects in places that would have attracted private development anyway, 
or few obstacles bestowing subsidies greater than necessary upon firms agreeing to locate 
in marginal areas.  TIF underscores the sharply competitive structure of inter-local 
relations among adjacent municipalities in metropolitan areas.  TIF is a popular tool used 
by neighboring cities as part of the ongoing interlocal bidding war for business 
investment (Briffault, 2010).  This investment is especially critical during these tough 
economic times as municipalities fight for tax revenue to pay for local services.  A 
recommendation in order to eliminate TIF being used as a weapon between neighboring 
municipalities is to promote greater regional cooperative government.  A third party 
meditator may be necessary if the entities are unable to find common ground.  Another 
remedy to stifle this competition is to limit the use of TIF to urban cities.  This limitation 
would help minimize urban sprawl.  After all, much of the original intent of TIF was to 
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promote the redevelopment of older, poorer neighborhoods that have blighted or 
dilapidated structures.  
Lastly, many local governments do not bother to analyze whether TIF projects are 
net tax revenue producers, or bother to assess periodically whether actual yields match 
initial projections.  Adopting formal TIF guidelines that are rooted in community-based 
goals is one alternative to help minimize inadequate TIF feasibility analyzation.  In 
addition to TIF guidelines, local officials may benefit from third party analyses of 
redevelopment plans submitted to them for consideration of TIF assistance.  Furthermore, 
many large cities hire consultants to review TIF applications to help them determine 
objectively whether the proposal meets the statutory “blight” and “but for” requirements, 
or if there are other options available to the local officials to help the development occur 
without TIF (Public Policy Forum, 2009).   
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What Type of Municipalities Utilize TIF in Wisconsin 
 In Wisconsin, research has determined that big, slow-growth communities, such 
as Milwaukee or Green Bay, use TIF less than their small and medium-sized counterparts 
like Glendale or Ashwaubenon.  The City of Glendale’s use of TIF to support the recent 
development of Bayshore Mall is a noteworthy example.  In 2008, its TIF utilization rate 
exceeded 22% compared with a 3% rate in the much larger city of Milwaukee (Public 
Policy Forum, 2009).  However, the city of Milwaukee has a much greater percentage of 
properties that are TIF eligible, such as blemished, vacate buildings.  
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TIF and Municipal Employment 
Proponents of TIF passionately argue that TIF development leads to higher 
employment within the TIF district.  The proponent’s argument is narrow and focuses on 
the employment effect within the TIF district.  However, where is this new employment 
being taking from? If TIF is used to finance the relocation of a business from one part of 
the municipality into the TIF district, the employment increases with the TIF district are 
not true employment increases.  TIF-supported relocation results in a positive municipal-
wide employment effect only when businesses relocate from outside the municipality, or 
if TIF induces the relocated businesses to expand their workforces (Byrne, 2009).  
This same argument can be regionally extended.  Many TIF districts are created in 
urban environments. However, these TIF urban developments have a tendency to pull 
employment to the large cities while reducing employment in the suburbs or surrounding 
communities. Furthermore, the type of municipalities that use TIF to attract 
redevelopment is also factored into whether the development creates a net positive 
employment increase in the TIF district.  For example, “big box” retailors such as Wal-
Mart have changed the retail market from smaller “mom and pop” stores, “into larger 
stores that are less labor-intensive stores”.  Therefore, TIF supported transition to larger, 
more labor-efficient retailers could result in a negative employment effect (Byrne, 2009).  
Contrarily, TIF developments which are classified as industrial are more likely to be 
firms whose competitors and customers are primarily located outside of the TID.  In such 
cases, employment growth within a TIF district from an industrial development would 
most likely result in a positive employment effect (Byrne, 2009).  Interestingly, 
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residences are not major employers in a TIF district.  However, if TIF facilitates the 
replacement of dilapidated housing occupied by low-income residents with higher-quality 
units occupied by residents with higher incomes, a positive employment effect could 
exist.  By replacing low–income residents with high-income residents who spend more 
money, adoption of a Housing TIF District could result in a derivative effect of 
businesses (and employees) catering to the new high-income residents (Byrne, 2009).  
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Suggested Remedies to Deal with Blight and Urban Sprawl 
 Many cities incorporated anti-blight ordinances to deal with deteriorated 
properties. The idea is rather simple; the purpose of an anti-blight ordinance is to identify 
blighted properties and to motivate owners to remediate the situation by means of the 
issuance of official notices and, in some cases, by levying fines.  Ultimately, anti-blight 
ordinances provide for the possession and/or demolition of blighted buildings or 
structures by municipalities (Setterfield).  Another idea includes exploring the use of land 
value taxation (LVT) rather than TIF.  LVT is a method of raising public revenue by 
means of an annual charge on the rental value of land.  Although described as a tax, it is 
not really a tax at all, but a payment for benefits received. It would replace, not add to, 
existing taxes.  Properly applied, Land Value Tax would support a whole range of social 
and economic initiatives, including housing, transport, and other infrastructural 
investments. It is an elementary fiscal measure that would go far toward correcting 
fundamental economic and social ills. The value of every parcel of land would be 
assessed regularly, and the land value tax levied as a percentage of those assessed values.  
"Land" means the site alone, not counting any improvements. The value of buildings, 
crops, drainage, or any other works which people have erected or carried out on each plot 
of land would be ignored, but it would be assumed that all neighboring properties were 
developed as at the time of the valuation; other components being equal, a vacant site in a 
row of houses would be assessed at the same value as the adjacent sites occupied by 
houses.  The valuation would be based on market evidence, in accordance with the 
optimum use of the land within the planning regulations. If the current planning 
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restrictions on the use were altered, the site would be reassessed. Proponents of LVT cite 
the following advantages: (Land Value Taxation Campaign ) 
First, it’s a natural source of public revenue. All land makes its full contribution to 
the tax base, thus allowing reductions in existing taxes on labor and enterprise. 
Second, it grows a stronger economy. If we tax labor, buildings, or machinery and 
plants, we discourage people from constructive and beneficial activities and penalize 
enterprise and efficiency. The reverse is the case with a tax on land values, which is 
payable regardless of how well the land is actually used.  It is a payment, based on 
current market value, for the exclusive occupation of a piece of land.  In the longer term, 
this fundamentally new approach to revenue raising will stimulate new business and new 
employment, reducing the need for costly government welfare programs. 
Third, marginal areas are revitalized.  Economic activities are handicapped by 
distance from the major centers of population. Conventional taxes such as Value Added 
Tax and those on transport fuels cause particular damage to the more remote areas of the 
country.  Land Value Tax, by definition, bears lightly, or not at all, where land has little 
or no value, thereby stimulating economic activity away from the center; it creates what 
are, in effect, tax havens exactly where they are most needed. 
Fourth, a more efficient land market is created. The necessity to pay the tax 
obliges landowners to develop vacant and under-used land properly, or to make way for 
others who will. 
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Fifth, it encourages less urban sprawl. Land Value Taxation deters speculative 
land holding. Thus dilapidated inner-city areas are returned to good use, reducing the 
pressure for building on green-field sites. 
Sixth, less bureaucracy is needed. The complexities of Income Tax, Inheritance 
Tax, Capital Gains Tax and VAT are well known. By contrast, Land Value Tax is 
straightforward. Once the system has settled down, landholders will not be faced with 
complicated forms and demands for information. Revaluation will become relatively 
simple. 
Seventh, there will be little or no avoidance or evasion from tax violators.  Land 
cannot be hidden, removed to a tax haven, or concealed in an electronic data system. All 
property owners would have “skin in the game” under a LVT system. 
Eighth, an LVT system elicits an end to boom-slump cycles. Speculation in land 
value - frequently misrepresented and disguised as "property" or "asset" speculation - is 
the root cause of unsustainable booms which result periodically in damaging corrective 
slumps. Land Value Taxation, fully and properly applied, knocks the speculative element 
out of land pricing. 
Ninth and final reason an LVT system will work:  It is less plausible to pass on in 
higher prices, to lower wages earners in the form of higher rents. Competition makes it 
impossible for a business producing goods on a valuable site to charge more per item 
than one producing similar goods on less valuable land - after all, producers and traders at 
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different locations are paying different rents to landlords, now, yet, “like goods” 
generally sell for much the same price and employers pay their workers comparable 
wages. The tax cannot be passed on to a tenant who is already paying the full market rent 
(Land Value Taxation Campaign ).  
Another method to deal with urban blight while promoting community 
development is incorporating an aggressive urban planning component.  For example, 
during the early 1970s, the City of Portland, Oregon, began to suffer from the symptoms 
of urban flight.  Forty years later, however, it is considered to be a model for planners, 
due to having controlled suburban sprawl, fostering extensive use of public transport, and 
significantly revitalizing its inner-city. This has all been brought about by a very tight 
“green belt” law, which has banned development outside a boundary encircling the city, 
and thus forced development back into the inner-city (Setterfield).  The research from the 
Portland Revitalization Plan is very encouraging.  The study determined that housing 
density increased. Portland, nevertheless, increased housing densities by putting more 
people on less land even though they were below planners' targets.  Densities for new 
development increased on average from five homes per acre (one-fifth of an acre per 
home) to eight homes per acre (one-eighth of an acre per home) from 1994 to 1997.  The 
amount of land used for new housing development has declined as multifamily housing 
units have increased from 25 percent of all building permits in 1992 to 49 percent in 
1997.  The Portland study also concluded that the development of infill land increased 
under the “green belt” redevelopment program. Vacant land within the growth boundary 
is disappearing.  It has fallen from 75,000 acres in 1985 to less than 55,000 today. Once 
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environmentally sensitive and otherwise undevelopable land is considered, the amount 
falls to less than 38,000 acres. While almost 40 percent of the land in the boundary was 
vacant in 1980, the share of total vacant land represented just 19.8 percent of the land by 
1997, less than 14 percent when undevelopable land is considered. Portland's current 
refill rate rests at 25.4 percent.  In other words, about one-fourth of all housing units built 
inside the growth boundary are either infill lots or re-development of existing property.  
Higher refill rates and rebounding home prices in inner-city neighborhoods should mean 
the goals of revitalization and increasing density are being met (Mildner, 1999).  
However, there was a double-edged sword noted in the Portland study.  Inner-city 
Portland appeared to benefit from these higher rates of redevelopment.  From 1990 to 
1995, inner-city neighborhoods in Portland experienced a substantial increase in home-
price inflation: the North, Southeast, and Northeast areas of the City of Portland saw their 
housing prices increase the fastest. Home prices in North Portland doubled, rising from 
$41,300 in 1990 to $83,800 in 1995 (in non-inflation adjusted dollars). The average home 
price among these cities increased from $97,684 to $152,700 (Mildner, 1999).  These 
increased housing costs have been transferred to renters and low income renters have 
been adversely affected. In addition, less infill land has resulted in less open space where 
children may have played, or groups may have used for community gardening.  
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Summary 
 
To summarize, this paper has discussed the positive and negative attributes 
associated with TIF usage in Wisconsin.  Also discussed was the history and original 
intent of TIDs.  The original purpose of TIDs was to redevelop inner city properties that 
were considered blemished.  Unfortunately, the poor regulation of the use of TIDs has 
been expanded and abused by developers and politicians for developmental projects that 
do not meet the legal definition of a blighted property.  This abuse has clouded the intent 
of TIDs as a redevelopment economic tool to a developmental instrument for properties 
that are not dilapidated or legally eligible to be considered for a tax incremental financing 
project. To curb these abuses, strict regulation and a clear, non-ambiguous definition of a 
blemished property should be created and strictly enforced.  In addition, the “but for” test 
theory should be replaced with the “what if”, which asks the question “What will be the 
overall positive impact to the district if this development is approved and allowed to 
proceed?” 
TIF usage should also be regulated to private sector developments.  Non-profit 
and public sector projects should be restricted from TIF because, in most cases, these 
entities are exempt from paying property taxes.  Therefore, the TID never realizes the tax 
increment as a result of the property value increase.  
In addition, this paper has discussed TID usage trends and the significant 
increases of TIDs in the state of Wisconsin. The state of Wisconsin has a high level of 
TID utilization compared with many other states.  The high level of TID usage should be 
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monitored to minimize tax payer leverage and risk associated with default if these TIDs 
fail.  
Additional research is recommended to determine whether TID increases overall 
property tax values, and a negative, positive or neutral gain in employment. The 
researcher believes that there is short term employment increases as a result of the 
construction and development associated with TID projects in the specific vicinity that 
the project is being constructed. However, after the construction has been completed, the 
employment is most likely shifted from one location to another, resulting in a neutral 
employment gain. In some cases, the employment as a result of the redevelopment may 
actually be lower.  An example of lower employment was discussed in this paper citing 
the example of the “big box retailer”, which utilizes fewer employees to operate in an 
efficient manner compared with the locally owned “mom and pop” store. Furthermore, 
the state of Wisconsin needs to monitor and disallow further TID entities when the 
equalized value of property in the district, plus the value increment of all existing 
districts, exceeds 12% of the total equalized value of taxable property.  This will ensure 
the tax payer is not leveraged to a high level of risk associated with the negative 
consequences which may result in default, and leave the tax payers liable.  
The positive and negative attributes associated with TIDs will continue to be 
debated. However, TIDs are one of the few economic tools that entities have to combat 
blighted properties that are doing little more than taking up space, and, in many cases, 
provide a safe haven that fosters criminal activity, and provides cover to detrimental 
unfavorable activities which lower adjacent property values and adversely affects a 
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community’s reputation.  There are many places where TIDs can, and should, be 
successfully implemented.  However, the criteria for selection should be tightly regulated 
to minimize tax payer risks, and to benefit the entire community.  
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